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Abstract
Why is India unable to maintain regional leadership in a nuclearized South Asia? In 
this paper, we explore the impediments to India’s regional leadership by examining 
Delhi’s foreign policy behavior within the nuclearized rivalry with Pakistan since 
1998. Based on a comparison of Indian foreign policy elites’responses to a set of 
dyadic crises since overt nuclearisation in 1998, we argue that structural parameters 
of South Asia’s current security environment undermine the prospects of coercing 
or influencing the behavior of India’s most potent contender. More specifically, we 
argue that Delhi’s failure to develop an effective strategy to deter armed resistance 
is largely due to the combined presence of militant groups and inadequate deter­
rence strategies. Recurrent, undeterred militant attacks have thus become a symbol 
of resistance against India’s predominance in the region.
Keywords
Regional Powers, Complex Balancing, India, Pakistan, Deterrence, Nuclear 
Terrorism
Introduction
Extant International Relations (IR) scholarship on contemporary power transi­
tions has largely focused on the activism of rising powers in their relations to 
established great powers and in specific policy areas in global governance (Gray Sc 
Murphy 2013; Kahler 2013; Paul 2016; Stuenkel 2016a). While there is neither 
academic nor policy consensus on which countries should be defined as “rising” or 
“emerging” powers, most studies in the past decade have included China, India, 
Brazil, and South Africa in this category based on material (mainly economic and 
military) indicators (Stuenkel 2016b). As a result, there is little discussion in this
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literature over how the situation of these so-called rising powers first emerged 
and eventually came to dominate a particular regional order. Are rising powers 
automatically regional powers or leaders? Is regional power status a static one or 
does it need to be maintained? Barring a few exceptions, much of the existing lit­
erature has neglected the process of formation, and especially of the maintenance, 
of regional leadership. To contribute to this debate, this paper addresses the fol­
lowing puzzle: why has India not been able to maintain regional leadership in a 
nuclearized South Asia?
More specifically, this paper seeks to understand the impediments to India’s re­
gional leadership by examining Delhi’s foreign policy behavior within the nucle­
arized rivalry with Pakistan since 1998 in four steps. First, the paper reviews the 
literature on India’s deliberate and indirect claims to regional leadership in South 
Asia, and its limitations in accounting for regional dynamics since 1998. Second, 
the paper discusses the theoretical assumptions about the links between regional 
leadership and nuclear deterrence as well as their limitations in accounting for the 
complex regional dynamics in South Asia. A third section looks at the increasing 
use of non-state actors as a foreign policy tool by Pakistan since the late 1980s 
and examines India’s attempts to manage proxy contestation in order to preserve 
its regional leadership in nuclear South Asia. Finally, we conclude and suggest 
ways in which our empirical observations from the South Asian case can inform 
scholarship on contested regional leadership and deterrence.
The South Asia case illustrates that neither does economic capacity necessar­
ily translate into military capabilities nor do capabilities automatically correlate 
with influence (cp. Brooks &c Wohlforth 2016). While “economic growth and a 
large and diverse economy are certainly necessary preconditions of power” and 
“a basic component of India’s rise”, it is less clear “how economic growth could 
provide the strategic basis for India’s rise” (Khilnani 2015, p.688). Contemporary 
South Asia thus purportedly constitutes a case of “unipolarity without hegemony” 
(Wilkinson 1999; Buzan 2011) with India’s role limited to that of a “reluctant 
hegemon” (Mitra 2003). This feature complicates applying existing IR  models 
premised on a close correlation between capabilities, influence, and domination 
to South Asia and renders it a deviant case of systemic Security Studies scholar­
ship and thus an illustrative and critical example of regional leadership in times of 
multipolarity (cp. Thomas 2004, p.326).
Regional Leadership in South Asia: Limits to India’s Claim?
Leadership can be understood as “the ability to make others follow goals and 
positions which these others did not previously share and/or to make others 
support an increase in status and power of the emerging power” (Schirm 2010,
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p.200).1 Leadership is distinct from the traditional Realist definition of regional 
hegemony which understands hegemons as states that are “significantly stronger 
than other states in the system on both economic and military dimensions; (b) 
aware of its power preponderance and willing to use it to shape its international 
environment according to its interests and values; and (c) active in the building, 
developing, and sustaining of various international institutions, which reflect the 
negotiation and renegotiation of hegemonic bargains with other states in the sys­
tem” (Jesse et al. (2012, p.7). In contrast, we build our understanding of leadership 
inductively by tracing the social interactions and the roles played and responsibili­
ties assumed by the Indian state, an approach inspired by more recent English 
School conceptualizations of hegemony (Clark 2011).
Regional leadership is commonly associated with three factors: power resources, 
claim to leadership, and acceptance of leadership by other powers in the region 
(cp. Prys 2012). While the Indian state has possessed considerable advantages in 
terms of national power capabilities compared to its South Asian neighbors and 
made some claims for leadership since 1947, it has overall failed to garner regional 
acceptance of this status. First, regarding the evolution of the distribution of pow­
er capabilities, the contemporary South Asian region has been characterized by 
a unipolar system with a highly unequal distribution of material capacities, with 
India as the sole pole and Pakistan lagging far behind as the secondary regional 
power (Ebert &  Blarel 2018). In fact, the distribution of power capabilities be­
tween India and Pakistan (and thereby with other regional actors) since 1947 has 
been constantly asymmetric and substantially favorable to India. Second, Indian 
leaders have long sought to play a role commensurate to India’s geographic size, 
economic capacity and political standing in South Asia. Since its independence in 
1947, Indian elites have perceived India as the main regional power in the South 
Asian subcontinent.
W ith regard to the third criteria, most accounts have noted that while India 
might have been capable and willing to establish regional leadership, its effective­
ness to do so has been limited. In contrast to traditional Realist assumptions on 
the stabilizing effects of hegemonic power concentrations, India was unable to use 
its national power capability advantages to establish a stable, peaceful hegemonic 
order (Mukherjee &  Malone 2010, pp.57-63). In South Asia, the dissatisfied 
yet materially far weaker secondary power, Pakistan, has traditionally initiated 
armed conflict irrespective of the relative power disadvantage, including three out 
of four wars fought between the two rivals. In 1947, when relative capabilities 
were already substantially favouring India, which received 70 percent of the co­
lonial British Indian army’s movable military infrastructure and military officers,
1 For a discussion of the different types of regional leadership, see the introduction to this special issue 
by Fiemes and Ebert.
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Pakistan’s political-military leadership provoked the first war over Kashmir, again 
defied its relative capability disadvantage in the second Kashmir war in 1965, 
supported an insurgency against the central government in Indian-controlled 
Jammu and Kashmir in 1990, and launched a military operation in Jammu and 
Kashmirs Kargil heights in 1999 (Ganguly 2001, pp.19—20). Similarly, deviating 
from wide-spread Liberal Institutionalist propositions, the rising regional power 
has been unable to build institutions to increase its legitimacy or foster regional 
integration through the provision of public goods. South Asia thus remains the 
“world’s politically and economically least integrated, as well as one of the most 
violent regions” (Cohen 2015, p.341).
Despite its national power capability advantages, New Delhi has been unable 
to formulate a way of dispatching, compromising with, or ignoring its region­
al challenger Pakistan (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen 2007, 190). India’s former 
Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, even acknowledged that India’s current Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi as well as his two predecessors, Manmohan Singh and 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had been conscious that “heightened tensions with Paki­
stan constrain India’s ability to play a larger regional and global role” and “create 
space for intervention by major powers, in particular the US and China” (Saran 
2015). Moreover, India’s more recent foreign policies toward its Eastern neigh­
bours Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka illustrate how predominantly hegemonic 
strategies failed to generate followership (Destradi 2012).2
India’s regional policies have varied over time, from a more or less benign leader­
ship under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to more assertive hegemonic bids 
under Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi (Hagerty 1991; Prys 
2012). Since the early 1990s, India’s mostly deliberate strategy of regional domi­
nance has waxed and waned depending on the personalities of Prime Ministers 
and the political constellations in power. India has resorted to measures ranging 
from outright military intervention to coercive economic diplomacy to induce
2 By contrast, former Indian Foreign Secretary D ixit (2001, pp.56-7) argued that the “assertion that 
India has hegem onistic ambitions is irrational” given “India’s own internal problems, resource con­
straints and preoccupations w ith national consolidation (in the face o f continuing domestic centrifugal 
challenges)”, even if  “India’s physical size, demography, resources, technological capacities and the size 
o f  its defence forces make its regional power status an existentialist reality”. Interpreting India’s past 
interventions into Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka as indicators for hegemonic or expansionist 
ambitions was misleading, as these were requested by the respective governments, resulted from devel­
opments in these countries conversely affecting India’s security, and ended as soon as the mission was 
completed or the respective government asked for withdrawal. Echoing these observations, Sridharan 
argued that India does not even qualify as a regional power’, as i t  only fulfils one o f three criteria for a 
regional power. W hile post-independence India has always been preem inent in terms of power resourc­
es with the size o f its territory, population, economy and military larger than the rest o f South Asia 
combined, it has neither been accepted by regional neighbors as a “natural leader and spokesperson” nor 
has it had the power o f compellence over its neighbors. W ith  the exception o f perhaps Bhutan, all other 
South Asian states, in particular “Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or even Nepal or more recently the 
Maldives ( ...)  have resisted India’s wishes or demands” (Sridharan 2015, p.703).
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various neighbors to conform to its expectations. Less discussed as a component 
of the regional leadership toolkit is the strategy of deterrence. Deterrence has 
been a key instrument of India’s strategy to maximize regional security. India’s 
then-National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, outlined in 1999 that through 
its conventional military superiority and a credible nuclear deterrent since 1998, 
India has aimed to preserve an “environment of durable peace” in the South Asian 
region (Mishra 1999). Regional stability and peace are deemed essential for In­
dian decision-makers to ensure its primary goals of domestic “economic, political, 
social, scientific and technological development” (ibid.). This supports the gen­
eral argument that unipolar powers carry out a “defensive-dominance strategy” to 
preserve the status quo, mainly existing territorial boundaries and political align­
ments, as well as freezing the distribution of power in the region (Monteiro 2012, 
p.23). As a result, while followership presupposes that subordinate actors in the 
regional system have incentives to support and conform to a hierarchical order, 
notably because the regional leader provides a type of social order to legitimize its 
authority (Bukovansky et al. 2012, pp.6-7; Ikenberry 2011, p.6), we argue that a 
prior condition for the establishment for such an institutionalized regional lead­
ership role is the acceptance of the unipolar security order by subordinate powers.3 
If  deterrence is not a tool to ensure social acceptance of regional leadership, it is 
nevertheless an important instrument to ensure territorial and security stability.
However, this paper will illustrate how India’s traditional nuclear deterrence strat­
egy, which had been an important tool to ensure a relatively stable security order, 
failed to cope with the changing post-Cold War environment and strategies of 
Pakistan. The combined impact of the nuclearization of the subcontinent and 
of cross-border militant activity has created an environment prone to low-level 
violence and persistent contestation of India’s regional leadership status. A pecu­
liar set of conditions has emerged that involves a series of previously overlooked 
non-state actors that have capitalized on the presence of nuclear weapons and in­
creasingly shaped the strategic calculations of New Delhi and Islamabad.4 These 
conditions have also increased the costs for India to maintain its regional leader 
status. To our knowledge, there is no precedence in the literature on regional 
system leadership management and maintenance for such complex nuclearized 
environments involving non-state actors. We trace the development and impact 
of these new dynamics in the next section.
3 Compare the argument developed by M onteiro (2012, p.23).
4 O ther deficiencies o f classic nuclear deterrence theory applied to South Asia have already been cov­
ered sufficiently, namely the “deficiencies in deterrence theory pertaining to conflictual dyads involving 
states differing vastly in size, resources, and power”, see Karnad (2005, p.173), and the misleading reli­
ance on unitary models o f deterrence stability, see Perkovich (2012)
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Regional Leadership and Deterrence: Moving Beyond Traditional Assump­
tions
Contested regional leadership is a widespread phenomenon and affects the rise of 
many contemporary rising powers. Responses to concentrations of regional power 
have taken varying forms (Fiemes &  Lobell 2015; Ebert &  Fiemes 2018). A 
common finding within the literature on strategies of contestation and leadership 
is that explanatory frameworks traditionally used to account for global systemic 
power interactions (such as balancing and bandwagoning) have not been particu­
larly useful to understand regional sub-systemic dynamics, mainly due to specific 
regional factors and configurations.
This also applies to the attempts made by various scholars to adopt traditional 
models of nuclear deterrence to explain regional power contests. The study of 
nuclear deterrence and its implications for regional leadership emerged from the 
experience of the US-Soviet global nuclear confrontation. Much of this litera­
ture has focused on the bipolar opposition and the implications of the nuclear 
revolution in reducing large-scale wars. Traditional theories of nuclear deterrence 
modelled nuclear competition as a confrontation between two unitary, rational 
actors aspiring global dominance (Mesquita &  Riker 1982). Building on these 
assumptions, nuclear “optimists” such as Kenneth Waltz argued that the contin­
ued proliferation of nuclear weapons had the potential to reduce the recurrence 
of conflict (Waltz 1981). Nuclear “optimists” maintained that the possession of 
nuclear weapons raised the costs of conventional conflicts, increased the risks of 
escalation, and therefore deterred leaders from engaging in war against nuclear­
armed states. Other scholars have been more skeptical, and even actively “pes­
simistic”, about the alleged stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons. They pointed 
to the risks of preventive wars, crisis instability, and accidental nuclear detonation 
(Sagan 1995). According to these nuclear “pessimists”, the possession of nuclear 
weapons actually contributed to greater levels of international instability.
The end of the Cold War and the spread of nuclear weapons to new players, 
most of them regional powers, encouraged scholars to reassess the conventional 
wisdom which had prevailed around deterrence as a leading theoretical and policy 
framework. Moving away from the US-USSR confrontation and parsimonious 
models derived from microeconomic theories, some scholars attempted to resume 
the debate on the effects of nuclear deterrence on stability in new regional settings 
like the India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation (Sagan 2009; Sagan &  Waltz 2002). 
However, by trying to translate the same theoretical debate to regional contexts, 
the existing scholarship has overlooked other important factors, especially wheth­
er nuclear proliferation may have changing effects over varying regional contests 
of leadership.
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Building on this observation, some scholars have emphasized the differential ef­
fects of nuclear proliferation over certain regions and actors. Most recently, Vipin 
Narang argued that regional powers face different constraints and opportunities 
than superpowers, have arsenals that are orders of magnitude smaller, and must 
manage different conflict environments and projected their power and ambitions 
in smaller geographic areas than the US and USSR did, thus facing different stra­
tegic opportunities and constraints (Narang 2014, pp.24—25). These actors had 
varying success in deterring regional conflict. For instance, India has not been able 
to deter Pakistan’s use of force, such as the 1999 Kargil conflict demonstrated. Is­
rael has also not been able to deter its regional adversaries in 1973, in spite of hav­
ing nuclear weapons. Consequently, Narang claimed that not all nuclear states act 
the same way and that state intentions ultimately inform the way nuclear-armed 
states will behave (ibid.). Both the regional hegemon and the regional subordinate 
power(s) can choose a diverse array of nuclear postures and strategies (capabilities, 
employment modes, and command-and-control procedures) that diverge signifi­
cantly from those pursued by nuclear great powers during the Cold War.
Deterrence dynamics in contemporary South Asia provide strong evidence for 
this deviance from traditional deterrence and security management models. The 
South Asian subcontinent has witnessed a series of bilateral crises following the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons from both India and Pakistan in 1998.5 Various 
studies argued that the stabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation were hardly au­
tomatic in the region (Ganguly &  Hagerty 2005; Basrur 2009), and that the pos­
session of nuclear weapons actually facilitated limited or proxy wars (Kapur 2007; 
Narang 2013). These works notably built on the concept of the “stability-insta­
bility paradox” to oppose the strategic stability argument of deterrence.6 Some 
scholars demonstrated that the conditions of this phenomenon were for instance 
present in South Asia: the nuclearization of the subcontinent could be perceived 
as an insurance policy against the most dangerous types of escalation, thereby 
encouraging war-making below the nuclear threshold (Krepon 2003).
However, the evolving scholarship on the intricacies of regional deterrence in 
South Asia has yet to address the issue of how changes in traditional deterrence 
dynamics and strategies have affected the maintenance of India’s regional leader­
ship. In regions with unipolar military balances which had been correlated with a 
relative absence of major conflicts like South Asia, nuclear weapons have actually
5 This paper will not delve into the empirical details of the different South Asian security crises o f the 
last 20 years, encompassing both the “opaque” or de facto nuclear period o f the 1980s and 1990s before 
the nuclear tests, and the more recent post-test conflicts, but will instead focus on their theoretical 
implications for the study o f deterrence. For more detailed accounts of these standoffs, see Ganguly and 
Hagerty (2005), Chari, Cheema, and Cohen (2007), and Ganguly and Kapur (2008).
0 Robert Jervis presented a definition o f the paradox: “to the extent that the military balance is stable 
at the level o f all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels o f violence”, see The I Ilogic 
of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984),
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emboldened states with traditional revisionist ambitions, such as Pakistan, into 
risk-acceptant behavior (Montgomery &  Edelman 2015). India has enjoyed a 
conventional military superiority over Pakistan since 1947, but in particular since 
the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971. This military imbalance was correlated with 
almost 30 years of reluctant Pakistani acquiescence of Indian regional leadership 
and the absence of any major conflicts in the Subcontinent (Ganguly &  Kapur 
2010, pp.15-16). After 1998, nuclear weapons actually disrupted this military 
balance and encouraged a more secured Pakistani leadership to resume its his­
torical revisionist territorial goals (Kapur 2007, pp. 115-140). As a result, overt 
nuclear capacities not only failed to deter Pakistan from accepting India’s military 
primacy, but actually created favorable conditions for Pakistan to adopt “aggres­
sive, extremely risky policies” (Ganguly &  Kapur 2010, pp.29-30). The following 
section makes an effort to model how, under conditions of nuclear bipolarity and 
proxy warfare, the renewed Pakistani contestation of India’s regional leadership 
status and India’s ensuing attempts to preserve its deterrence capacities and lead­
ership status have encouraged the outbreak of lower-level crises after decades of 
regional stability.
Mischief Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Implications for Regional Hegemony 
and Contestation
The most immediate threat to stability in South Asia since the late 1990s has 
been the role of non-state groups in instigating major diplomatic crises with es- 
calatory potential between India and Pakistan. There has been a long history of 
Pakistani-sponsored militants against Indian interests starting immediately after 
independence. Pakistan’s use of these non-state proxies can be explained by two 
factors. First, due to limited internal resources and extraction capabilities, the 
Pakistani government has sought to counter-balance the dyadic asymmetry with 
India by resorting to militant proxies (Kapur 2016). Second, the Pakistani army’s 
strategic culture has also led Pakistan to favor Islamic militant groups such as 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) andJaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) as regular instruments to 
contest India’s hegemony and the territorial status-quo in Kashmir (Fair, 2014).
Pakistan’s use of non-state proxies resumed in the 1980s and became more sys­
tematic in the Kashmir region in the late 1980s. Islamabad had previously used 
mujahedeen forces to destabilize the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and ap­
plied a similar strategy in Indian Kashmir when an indigenous uprising erupted 
in December 1989 (Ganguly 1997). Feeling constrained by India’s conventional 
military superiority, Pakistan has armed, trained, and given sanctuary to these 
militant organizations through its Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), dedi­
cated to establish Pakistani sovereignty over Kashmir (such as the LeT) and used 
them as tools of asymmetric warfare to tie down large numbers of Indian soldiers 
in Kashmir.
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Following the open nuclearization of the subcontinent in 1998, Pakistan-backed 
militant groups have launched increasingly aggressive terror operations in India 
(Fair 2014). For instance, the LeT attacked the Indian Parliament while it was in 
session on December 13,2001, and again led a series of carefully planned attacks 
against civilians in Mumbai in November 2008. Accused by India of helping and 
harboring terrorists, Pakistani authorities have either denied links with the per­
petrators of the attacks, or placed their leaders, like Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the 
head of the LeT’s charitable front organization, under temporary house arrest.7
While Pakistan has benefited from this asymmetric warfare strategy, militant or­
ganizations like the LeT have not always shared the aims and/or serve the inter­
ests of their sponsor and host state (Ganguly &  Kapur 2010; Perkovich 2012). 
Gradually, the LeT started pursuing a broader global ideological agenda that 
transcended revisionist territorial ambitions in Indian Kashmir (Phillips 2012; 
Tankel 2011). Some jihadi organizations in Pakistan like the Tehrik-e-Taliban 
(TTP) have also turned against the Pakistani government because of its coopera­
tion with US anti-terrorism efforts (Kapur 2016, pp.116-121).
Given the militants’ increasing operational and ideological autonomy, the most 
imminent threat to stability in South Asia arguably results from major diplo­
matic crises with escalatory potential instigated by these non-state actors. Under 
conditions of persistent refusal from Pakistan to accept the regional status quo, 
the escalatory conditions are ripe for terrorist groups to operate with impunity 
through the protection of the nuclear umbrella, which inherently limits any pos­
sible military reprisals. As a result, India was compelled to confront such transna­
tional threats to preserve its regional leadership.
Nuclear postures are traditionally designed to discourage another state from tak­
ing military action by making the prospect of costs and risks outweigh prospective 
gains, in order to freeze the existing territorial status quo. But what happens if 
nuclear proliferation actually emboldens secondary powers to become revision­
ist? In addition, what if a third party, such as a transnational non-state actor (like 
LeT), enters the equation? In the traditional logic of deterrence, India can signal 
credible nuclear threats, which then make Pakistani-sponsored attacks against 
India prohibitively expensive. Instead, the fear of nuclear escalation has limited 
India’s strategic options for retaliation and truncated the traditional asymmetry 
in regional politics.
Non-state groups do not share the same interpretations of the costs and benefits 
that are presumed to guide the Pakistani authorities when dealing with India
7 Hafiz M oham m ed Saeed walked free from house arrest in November 2017 after a Pakistan court 
ordered his immediate release and planned to run for Pakistan’s general elections in  2018. See The 
Indian Express (2017).
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(Adler 2009). First, in its official doctrine, India does not aim to deter cross- 
border terrorism or insurgency with the use of nuclear weapons. However, faced 
with repeated cross-border proxy attacks, India has engaged in debates on how to 
adapt to this new situation in order to both preserve the credibility of its nuclear 
deterrent and of its regional leadership. As argued above, dominant powers in 
unipolar systems have adopted approaches to preserve the status quo and to limit 
any revisionist efforts. India’s determination to maintain its regional leadership 
status have led New Delhi to develop ad-hoc strategies to counter Pakistan’s nu­
clear blackmail in the context of three major diplomatic crises in 2001—2,2008, 
and 2016.
India’s efforts to deter further asymmetric attacks by Pakistan have been visible 
through two different strategies. The first strategy that India has opted was to 
direcdy threaten to punish the host state of terrorist groups, Pakistan. By recast­
ing the strategic interaction into a traditional deterrence confrontation between 
two states, India attempted to maintain its no-first use pledge and its assured 
retaliation posture intact (Basrur 2009; Narang 2010). By applying nuclear and 
conventional pressure, India sought to convince the Pakistani host state of the 
costs of permitting continued attacks. India notably attempted to use this tra­
ditional deterrence strategy during the 2001-2002 crisis through a strategy of 
coercive diplomacy aiming to pressure the Pakistani government into reining its 
home-based terrorist groups.8 However the months-long mobilization procedure 
limited India’s window of actual offensive action and proved that such traditional 
deterring strategies were rendered obsolete by Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. Con­
sequently, the failure of “Operation Parakram” in 2001—2 to obtain definitive 
Pakistani guarantees to fight terrorism within its own territory demonstrated the 
practical difficulty of deterring such unconventional, low-level threats with con­
ventional coercive diplomacy (Ganguly &c Hagerty 2005).
The realization by the Indian authorities of the failure of traditional deterrence led 
the Indian military to consider a second option: striking at the militants them­
selves, notably through its “Cold Start” doctrine (Kanwal 2006; Ladwig 2008; 
Ahmed 2012; Khan 2012). Following the assault on the Parliament in December 
2001, Indian authorities quickly blamed JeM and the LeT but could not retaliate 
following the attack. These two groups had their camps on Pakistani territory. 
The 2001-2002 crisis, which followed only two years after the Kargil conflict, 
encouraged the Indian military to seek a new military doctrine and the capabili­
ties to deter Pakistan from undertaking or from permitting similar low-intensity 
aggression in the future. The objective of this new informal doctrine was to take 
hold of an important part of Pakistani territory large enough to harm Pakistan,
8 Coercive diplomacy can also be directed at multiple audiences. W ith  O peration Parakram, Indian 
authorities also attem pted to induce external actors like the US to weigh in the crisis and to pu t pres­
sure on Pakistan to cease its support of terrorist groups.
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but not to threaten the state’s survival. This strategy partially solved the problem 
of attribution, which is determinant for successful deterrence.
However, the difficulty with the operationalization of the Cold Start doctrine was 
that it could have created conditions for escalation and nuclear war. In future cri­
ses, Pakistan might not perceive the Indian reprisals as ‘limited’ and could decide 
to escalate the confrontation. The situation has further been complicated by the 
fact that Pakistan continually denied having any connection with or control over 
the perpetrators of the attacks. Furthermore, these strategies did not solve the 
long-term problem of militancy based in Pakistan (Ladwig 2008). The absence 
of any military retaliation following the Mumbai 2008 terrorist attacks, despite 
clear actionable evidence leading back to elements within Pakistan, demonstrated 
the difficulties of actually implementing conventional military retaliatory options 
against this particular type of attack.
Instead, following the attack in September 2016 by four men, identified by Indian 
authorities as members of the Pakistan-based JeM terrorist outfit, against an In­
dian army base located in the Kashmir town of Uri, killing a total of 19 soldiers, 
the Indian government announced that it had undertaken a series of undertaken 
military strikes against terrorist launch pads across the border and into so-called 
Azad Kashmir (Singh 2017). The deliberate decision to opt for a very limited 
retaliatory strike was the outcome of an ongoing strategic debate on how to deter 
and retaliate against terrorist infiltration into India while also limiting the pos­
sibilities of crisis escalation. Departing from its traditional retaliatory policy, India 
publicly branded its cross-border firing as “surgical strikes” and integrated them 
into a composite response which also included attempts to diplomatically isolate 
Pakistan at the regional and international levels. For instance, India supported 
global trade sanctions against Pakistan and considered rescinding Pakistan’s Most 
Favored Nation status (Sharma 2016; Singh 2016). India also threatened to uni­
laterally withdraw from the Indus Waters Treaty, a bilateral agreement ratified in 
1960 to share river waters (Jacob 2016). Finally, India successfully lobbied South 
Asian states to boycott the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) summit that Pakistan was to host in the weeks following the Uri at­
tack. After Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka followed India’s de­
cision to not attend the summit, Pakistan chose to postpone the summit (Roche 
2016).
The Indian post-Uri strategy demonstrated that India had opted for an unprec­
edented mixed strategy to deter Pakistan’s use of non-state proxies. The use and 
public announcement of limited surgical strikes to directly target militants was 
part of a more conventional strategy to ensure the credibility of its military de­
terrence capacities. In addition, India used economic sanctions to increase the 
economic costs linked to Pakistan’s resort to low-intensity warfare. Finally, In-
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dia also opted for strategies which are usually used by secondary powers to bind 
the unipolar powers’ behavior such as institutional balancing and cooperation 
through the SAARC to isolate Pakistan (for the concept, see He 2015). The use 
of institutional balancing strategies was reinforced through the mobilization of 
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) summit in September 
2017. The BRICS Xiamen declaration condemned a series of extremist groups, 
including the Haqqani network, LeT, and JeM, which have been active in Paki­
stan (Aneja 2017). These composite efforts have sought to highlight the military, 
economic and reputational costs for Islamabad to use non-state proxy warfare to 
further its gains. While the long-term strategic consequences of this new strategy 
are not completely clear when it comes to deterring and shaping Pakistan’s behav­
ior, these new developments lead to a renewed policy and scholarly debate about 
the process of leadership maintenance in a nuclearized maintenance.
Conclusion: Stability in a Complex Region
Understanding and managing the conditions for regional leadership maintenance 
in a nuclearized environment where terrorist activity has been proliferating is an 
understudied task. The first contention of this paper is theoretical: IR  scholarship 
on leadership and multipolarity should further explore how under the condition 
of nuclearized rivalry states use non-state proxies to truncate power asymmetries 
in regional unipolar systems. More systematically incorporating non-state mili­
tant actors in models of nuclear deterrence and leadership recognizes both the 
theoretical and policy challenges to traditional regional polarity dynamics. The 
existent IR scholarship on power shifts has often concentrated on dyadic inter­
state standoffs, often at the global role, and missed the disruptive role of non-state 
actors in the outbreak and/or escalation of Indo-Pakistani nuclear crises.
The entanglement of militant non-state actors in India’s and Pakistan’s regional 
strategies creates an even grimmer outlook and threatens to undermine the po­
tentially stabilizing effects of traditional nuclear deterrence. I f  a regional leader 
cannot deter “nuclear” militants, what alternative options remain for enabling 
stability and order in the region? Does this undermine broader efforts to institu­
tionalize regional hierarchy in the Subcontinent? The 2016 Uri attacks allegedly 
committed by Pakistan-based militants and India’s ensuing military retaliation as 
well as trade and institutional sanctions against the Pakistani state seem to have 
presented Pakistani policy-makers with new costs and a strategic dilemma. Will 
India manage to take back the initiative and to limit Pakistani possibilities of 
nuclear blackmail? Addressing this question is of immediate scholarly and policy 
relevance.
Second, while this paper has argued that the scholarship on regional leadership 
maintenance dynamics has built too exclusively on models of global hegemonic
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contests, there are nevertheless important and underexplored lessons from the 
Cold War bipolar system which can be applied to the South Asian context. For 
instance, encouraging regular and institutionalized dialogue between regional nu­
clear rivals may provide opportunities to address the challenges posed by complex 
South Asian security dynamics more effectively. This is not a completely unique 
situation as it could be argued that the U.S. and USSR, as two rivals compet­
ing for global hegemony, faced similar issues in the initial stages of their nuclear 
weapons programs. While one could argue that Cold War models did not explic­
itly integrate the problem of non-state actors, the two rivals did learnt to rein in 
the actions of their bloc allies and to put into place dialogue mechanisms to limit 
any escalation. Further research in early Cold War doctrines, command and con­
trol mechanisms, and gradual recognitions of red lines can help understand how 
nuclear learning has or has not occurred in the South Asian sub-system context 
(Khan, Jacobs &  Burke 2014; Nye 1987,1987).
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